Experienced Utility versus Decision Utility: Putting the 'S' in Satisfaction by Steven Carter & Michael McBride
Experienced Utility versus Decision Utility:
Putting the ‘S’ in Satisfaction
Steven Carter†
Department of Economics
University of California, Irvine
Michael McBride
Department of Economics
University of California, Irvine
This version: June 2009
Abstract
Recent research distinguishes an individual’s decision utility, inferred from her ob-
served choices, from her experienced utility, which more closely matches the notion of
happiness. Using various estimation techniques with a unique experimental data set,
we test whether post-choice satisfaction (experienced utility), like decision utility, is
S-shaped with loss aversion around a given reference point. We also present a model
which estimates the satisfaction function and reference point simultaneously. When
pooling the data across individuals, we ﬁnd an S-shaped satisfaction function in which
the reference point depends on past payments, social comparisons, and subjective ex-
pectations. There is mixed evidence of loss aversion. At the individual level, there is
substantial variation in satisfaction function shapes, although the S-shape is common.
Though the two notions of utility are distinct, our ﬁndings imply that the two are
related at a fundamental level.
JEL Classiﬁcations: C91, D70, I30.
Keywords: happiness, utility, experiment, value function, Prospect Theory.
We thank the Center for the Study of Democracy at UC Irvine for ﬁnancial support and the California
Social Science Experimental Laboratory at UCLA for programming assistance and use of laboratory facilities.
For insightful and encouraging comments, we thank many friends and colleagues, including Garth Halloway,
Ivan Jeliazkov, Marianne Bitler, and participants of the UCI Junior Faculty Lunch seminar, the 2008 Public
Choice Society Meetings, and the Mini-conference on Decision Analysis held at UC Irvine in July 2007.
Special thanks to Bill Branch for suggesting the subtitle.
†Corresponding author. 3151 Social Science Plaza, Irvine, CA, 92697-5100, sjcarter@uci.edu.
1"[The Prospect Theory value function] represents the decision utility of the gains
and losses associated with possible outcomes of the decision at hand; it is silent
about the post-choice experienced utility of the reference situation ...[I]nferences
from decision utility to experienced utility should be made with great caution."
Kahneman (1999, pp. 18-19, his italics)
1 Introduction
The modern economist’s notion of utility diers dramatically from that of utilitarian Jeremy
Bentham and his contemporaries. To these earlier thinkers, utility was the sum of expe-
rienced pleasures minus pains. This hedonic view of utility fell out of favor in the early
twentieth century when critics argued that pleasures and pains could not be measured.1
Economists instead redeﬁned utility to be a representation of preferences revealed through
observed behavior and commenced the reconstruction of economic theories.2 It was con-
cluded that theories of experienced pleasures and pains were not only scientiﬁcally problem-
atic, they were also unnecessary because utility conceived as consistent choice or revealed
preference was su!cient for constructing economic theories and evaluating policies.3
Though this behaviorist view of utility still dominates economics, Kahneman and others
have recently sparked a renewed interest in a notion of utility corresponding to hedonic ex-
perience (e.g., see Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin 1997). "Experienced utility" is not only
measurable, they argue, but also of fundamental importance for both understanding behavior
and selecting public policies because, as shown in various studies, experienced utility ("en-
joying") diers from decision utility ("wanting") in signiﬁcant ways. For example, Tversky
and Gri!n (2000 [1991]) report evidence that realized outcomes such as payments matter
more for decisions while contextual factors such as comparisons matter more for judgements
of hedonic experience, Loewenstein and Adler (1995) ﬁnd that subjects incorrectly predict
the extent to which their post-choice satisfaction adapts, and Schwarz and Strack (1999)
1This shift in economic thinking was initiated by Robbins (1932) and is tied to skepticism in the early
twentieth century about the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility (see Fleurbaey and Hammond
1998).
2For modern treatments of utility, see Fishburn (1987) or Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green (1995).
Stigler (1950a, 1950b) summarizes some developments of the use of the word "utility" in economics.
3However, Mandler (1999) describes problems that persist in the new theories.
2review evidence that judgements result from cognitive processes that depend on non-choice
related factors (also see Loewenstein and Ubel 2008).
This paper confronts the caution expressed in the epigraph. We explore whether the S-
shape property of empirically estimated decision utility functions is also found in experienced
utility. This S-shape represents Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) surprising yet ubiquitous
ﬁnding that individuals are generally risk averse when making decisions about gains but risk
loving when making decisions about losses. Figure 1 depicts such a function that is concave
in gains but convex in losses. Although not all individuals’ choices over gambles exhibit
the S-shape, the S-shape is modal and therefore provides a benchmark for understanding
how outcomes are valued (Luce 2000). The S-shaped value function assumed in Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) provides perhaps the
best known example of a theory inspired by the empirically derived S-shape.
This paper asks two questions: Is experienced utility S-shaped? If so, what determines
the reference point that separates gains from losses? The reference point is often taken
to be the status quo wealth position, a natural assumption in the context of gambles with
monetary gains and losses as the possible outcomes. Yet, Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 277,
286) initially acknowledged that the reference point will more generally depend on hedonic
adaptation, expectations, social comparisons, or other contextual factors. Previous research
has examined various candidates as factors that inﬂuence the reference point; e.g., the social
utility function literature focuses on social comparisons (see Suls and Wheeler 2000), the goal
literature focuses on subjective expectations (see Pervin 1989), and the adaptation literature
focuses on past experience (see Frederick and Loewenstein 1999). Because these factors
have generally been studied separately, it is not known which are relatively more important
when all are present. Even though "[t]he most basic problem of hedonic psychophysics
is the determination of the level of adaptation and aspirations that separates positive from
negative outcomes" (Kahneman and Tversky 1984: 349), "[h]ow multiple reference points are
integrated is an open question" (Camerer and Loewenstein 2004: 17). This open question
applies both to decision utility and experienced utility.
We use unique experimental data to estimate the shape of the post-choice satisfaction
function and its associated reference point. A key characteristic of our data is that they
3contain measures of three factors believed to aect an individual’s reference point: past
outcomes, expected outcomes, and outcomes of potential comparison groups. We conduct
a series of non-parametric and parametric regressions to let the data reveal the underly-
ing relationship between an outcome, reference point, and satisfaction. Many satisfaction
functions, when estimated by individual, are S-shaped, though this is not the modal shape.
Thus, similar to what Luce (2000) concludes with respect to decision theory value functions,
the S-shape should be understood as one of the various possible shapes observed in a het-
erogeneous population. When pooling all individuals’ observations, we ﬁnd that the shape
of the satisfaction function depends on the factor selected as the reference point: it is S-
shaped when using the expectations and social comparison as the reference point but is not
always S-shaped when using past outcomes as the reference point. When simultaneously
estimating a reference point function, we ﬁnd strong evidence of an S-shape, though the
evidence on loss aversion is mixed. We also ﬁnd that the reference point depends on all
three factors. Overall, we ﬁnd strong evidence in favor of an S-shaped satisfaction function,
and, as we suggest later, this evidence suggests that experienced utility and decision utility
are fundamentally related even though they are conceptually distinct.
For a comprehensive treatment of the resurgent interest in experienced utility, see Kah-
neman, Diener, and Schwarz’s (1999) edited volume.4 See Kahneman and Thaler (2006) for
a brief and more recent discussion. Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin (1997) provide a formal
normative theory of experienced utility, which provides a useful distinction between it and
decision utility. Because this work is relatively recent, it is not surprising that there have
been very few studies that examine whether experienced utility is S-shaped. Galanter (1990)
uses magnitude scaling to ﬁnd evidence that reported feelings of hypothetical monetary losses
and gains are S-shaped. Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) use reported life satisfaction as a proxy
for experienced utility and the predicted income of one’s social comparison group as one’s
reference income to ﬁnd that satisfaction is concave (not S-shaped) in annual income. La-
yard, Mayraz, and Nickell (2008) also use reported happiness to proxy for experienced utility
and ﬁnd happiness to be concave in income.5
4See Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008) for a more recent survey on the closely related research on relative
income and happiness.
5Though of a dierent vein, interested readers may also consider Brandstätter (2000), Loewenstein,
4Our study diers from these three last mentioned studies in important ways. While
Galanter (1990) asks respondents to rate happiness associated with hypothetical monetary
gains and losses, our experimental data have subjects rate an experience related to actual
monetary payments. Thus, our subjects’ responses more closely approximate the feeling of
an actual experience, while Galanter’s data are better described as representing predicted
experienced utility, which is known to suer a variety of biases (Loewenstein and Schkade
1999, Kahneman and Thaler 2006). Our data also dier in that they contains multiple
reference point factors, thereby allowing us to estimate how subjects calculate reference
points. The survey data used by Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) and Layard, Mayraz, and
Nickell (2008) capture the subjectively perceived value of life experience, and their rejection
of the S-shape in life satisfaction (happiness) and income survey data is an important ﬁnding
in the happiness literature. However, there are reasons why we might not predict an S-shape
in the life-as-a-whole context. For example, individuals with income well below that of their
comparison group may be living near or below subsistence, and such individuals may be very
risk averse in income instead of risk seeking. The experimental data studied here are from
a context much closer to the gambles setting (short time-frames, lower payments, etc.) in
which are found S-shaped decision utility. That we ﬁnd evidence of S-shape satisfaction in
the gambles setting implies that the life-as-a-whole context contains factors that work against
those that generate the S-shape. Vendrik and Woltjer also assume that the predicted income
of a comparison group is the reference point, while we consider how multiple factors into a
reference point. Layard, Mayraz, and Nickell do not consider reference points.
2H y p o t h e s e s
Although we emphasize the decision utility and experienced utility distinction, there is reason
to believe that an individual’s satisfaction (experienced utility or happiness) function, like
her decision utility function, should be S-shaped in our study. Speciﬁcally, decision utility
and experienced utility may both arise from the same underlying psychophysical processes.
Thompson, and Bazerman (1989), and Messick and Sentis (1985). Rablen (2008) deﬁnes a value function
to be the dierence between ex ante decision utility and ex post experienced utility, which he calibrates to
an S-shape.
5Psychophysics is a branch of psychology that studies the relationship between causal
physical stimuli and psychological values or judgements. An example would be the study
of how subjects rate the heaviness of various objects. Psychophysical research ﬁnds that
the amount a stimulus must be increased for an individual to recognize the dierence is
proportional to the stimulus magnitude itself (Marks and Algom 1998). For example, an
individual notices the dierence in weight between ten and ﬁfteen pound objects but not
between ﬁfty and ﬁfty-ﬁve pound objects; to notice an increase in weight from ﬁfty pounds,
the increase must be much more than ﬁve pounds. Similar ﬁndings arise when studying
the perception of brightness or loudness. The conclusion is that psychological intensity is
generally found to be a concave function in physical intensity. Many years ago, Bernoulli
used similar logic to propose utility functions with diminishing marginal returns (Zabell
1987).
The S-shaped decision utility function is believed to arise from similar psychophysical
processes: an individual experiences "diminishing sensitivity" from her reference point so
that gains relative to the reference point feel less and less good and losses feel less and less
bad and that a loss is always more worse than an equal sized gain is good (Hastie and
Dawes 2001). Diminishing marginal returns to gains yields a concave function in gains.
Diminishing returns to losses implies that the "badness" of a loss is a concave function in
losses, which translates into a convex function in goodness.
Notice that this claim about the origin of the S-shaped decision utility function implies
that the mapping from psychological valuation to decision utility maintains the fundamental
S-shape of the underlying psychological valuation. In eect, the claim is that "wanting" is
directly related to underlying psychological valuation. Moreover, if one accepts this claim,
one might also accept a claim that "enjoying" or "likeability" is also directly related to the
underlying psychological valuation in a manner that also maintains the S-shape. According
to this logic, decision utility and experienced utility are indirectly related: each is a mapping
of the same underlying psychophysical processes.
Formally, let } (||u),w i t h| 5 R, u 5 R, represent the underlying psychophysical sensation
of stimulus | given reference point u such that } (·) is dierentiable over (4>4) except at
6inﬂection point u,a n dw i t h
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Let e x(} (||u)) be a real-valued wantability function that maps sensation to wantability
("u" for the standard decision utility), and let e k(} (||u)) be a real-valued likeability function
("h" for happiness) that maps sensation to likeability or enjoyment. It is natural to assume
that both wantability and likeability are increasing in sensation, Ch x
C} A 0 and Ch k
C} A 0.F o r
convenience, we may also assume that each is also dierentiable over (4>4).
When a choice based study reports a decision utility function, it would thus be reporting
x(||u),w h e r ex(||u)  (e x  })(||u). Although the distinction between the psychological
sensation } (·) and the decision mapping e x(·) is conﬂated, as long as any curvature of e x(·)
is not too strong, the S-shape in the underlying sensation is reﬂected in x(·). Speciﬁcally, if
C2e x
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then x(·) is S-shaped in | with inﬂection point at u (see Proof 1 in the appendix). With
Ch x
C} A 0,C}








A 0, this condition states that C2h x
C}2 must be greater
than a negative amount and less than a positive amount. In other words, the curvature of
e x must be su!ciently close to zero.
Observed happiness k(||u),w i t hk(||u) 
³
e k  }
´
(||u), also conﬂates the enjoyment
mapping and sensation, yet a similar condition on the second derivative of e k(·) yields a
similar result. Given that we observe S-shaped x(·) in experimental data, which implies
limited curvature in e x(·), we may expect there to be limited curvature in e k(·).
Hypothesis 1 Experienced utility k(||u) is S-shaped.
For loss aversion in } (·) to also be reﬂected in x(·) or k(·) requires other conditions on
the wantability and likeability functions. With } ({|{)=0 ,w es a yt h a ts e n s a t i o n} (·) has
(strict) loss aversion if, for all {A0>
} (u + {|u) ? |} (u  {|u)|=
7For x to have loss aversion, assuming e x(} (0|u)) = 0,i tm u s tb et r u et h a tf o ra l l{A0
e x(} (u + {|u)) ? |e x(} (u  {|u))|=
As u !cient condition for this to be true is that e x(·) is concave (weak or strict) or not too
strictly convex (see Proof 2 in the appendix). That wantability exhibits loss aversion suggests
that this is the case, and we can conjecture that likeability exhibits a similar property.
Hypothesis 2 Experienced utility k(||u) exhibits loss aversion.
As mentioned above, the literature on reference points has identiﬁed three particular
factors at work in reference point determination. The ﬁrst is that individuals adapt to
past payments, i.e., that higher past payments increase one’s current reference point. The
second is that higher payments within one’s comparison group lead to an increase in one’s
reference point. The third is that the higher an individual’s expected payment, the higher
the reference point.
Hypothesis 3
(a) The reference point is increasing in past payment.
(b) The reference point is increasing in comparison payment.
(c) The reference point is increasing in expected payment.
There currently is no unifying theory of how dierent reference factors aggregate into
a single reference point. Without any particular guidance, we here propose a benchmark
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 The reference point is a weighted average of past payment, comparison
payment, and expected payment.
3E x p e r i m e n t a l D a t a
This study uses data from the experiment presented in McBride (2009). We provide here a
brief description of the experiment and refer the reader to his original paper for more details.
8After entering the experimental computer lab,6 each subject sits at a computer terminal,
receives verbal instructions, participates in one practice round, and participates in 25 real
rounds. In each round, each subject plays the Matching Pennies game against a randomly
selected computer "partner-type." There are ﬁve possible partner-types:
20% heads — 80% tails
35% heads — 65% tails
50% heads — 50% tails
65% heads — 35% tails
80% heads — 20% tails.
The computer reports the partner-type to the subject which informs the subject of the
probability distribution used by the computer to select the opponent’s coins in that round.
The choice of partner-type is i.i.d. across subjects and time so that in any given round some
subset of the subjects will be matched with a 20-80 type, another subset will be matched
with a 35-65 type, and so on. After being told the partner-type, the subject chooses heads
or tails for each of ﬁve coins, and the computer randomly and independently selects heads or
tails according to the partner-type distribution. For example, in a given round, the subject
might be matched with a 35-65 partner-type, choose (heads, heads, tails, tails, tails) for its
ﬁve coins, then learn that the computer randomly selected (tails, tails, heads, tails, tails)
for the partner. If the subject’s ﬁrst coin and the computer’s ﬁrst coin match (either both
are heads or both are tails), then the subject wins the coin, and so on for the other coins.
Figure 2 depicts the subject’s payo matrix for a single coin choice. With ﬁve coin choices,
a subject can win 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 coins in any given round.
After the computer partner’s choices are made, the computer reports to the subject the
coin choices made by the computer and the number of coins won by the subject. The subject
is also told the average coins won by others (not including herself) by partner type; i.e., she
is told the average of all those matched with a 20-80 partner-type, the average of all those
matched with a 35-65 partner type, and so on.
Immediately after being told the outcome of a round (i.e., the number of coins won and,
6The experiment was conducted at the California Social Science Experimental Laboratory (CASSEL)
located at UCLA.
9depending on the treatment, information about others’ coins won), the subject is asked, “How
satisﬁed are you with the result of this round?” The subject then reports her satisfaction on
a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 signifying “very dissatisﬁed,” 4 signifying “satisﬁed,” and 7 signifying
“very satisﬁed.”7 The form of this question matches the convention used in happiness and
life satisfaction surveys (Schwarz and Strack 1999). Although answers to these subjective
questions suer from various imperfections, it is widely held that these data meaningfully
capture relevant aspects of happiness or satisfaction.8
After all subjects report their satisfaction levels, the next round begins. Subjects are
randomly assigned a new, possibly dierent, partner-type. The selection of partner-types
is independent across subjects. Coin choices are independent across subjects and across
coins within a round for a given subject. Information on partner-types, coin choices, and
payments from prior rounds remains on the computer screen. The experiment session ends
after all 25 rounds have been completed. At the experiment’s end, subjects were paid actual
US dollars for their coins received according to an exchange rate of 8 coins for 1 dollar. The
experiment used 36 subjects and lasted approximately one hour. The average total take
home amount was roughly $17.
This experiment design has many important features. First, it yields data on multiple
reference point factors–past payments, expected payments, and others’ payments–thought
to aect an individual’s assessment of well-being. The subject’s past payments and that
subject’s information about others’ payments are displayed on the subject’s monitor. The
subject’s expected payment can be inferred from the partner-type. If the subject acts to
maximize her expected payment, she will choose all heads when paired with an 80-20 or
65-35 type, all tails when paired with a 35-65 or 20-80 type, and anything when paired with
a 50-50 type. These optimal actions yield expected payments for the round of 4 against the
7This type of question has been used to gather satisfaction or subjective well-being (i.e., happiness) data
in experiments (e.g., Charness and Grosskopf 2001) and surveys (e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004).
The term satisfaction is thought to entice a more cognitive response than the term happiness, which is
thought to be more emotive. The income-happiness literature uses the terms interchangeably because they
appear empirically equivalent (e.g., the title of Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell’s (2004) book includes both
terms). We suspect that the terms would yield similar results in this experiment, yet future experiments
must verify that conjecture. We use satisﬁed in the question in the unlikely case that satisfy does prompt a
more cognitive, thoughtful response.
8See Diener (1984) for an extended discussion of happiness and satisfaction questions. See Krueger and
Schkade (2008) for a recent analysis of the statistical validity and interpretation of thse questions.
1080-20 and 20-80 types, 3.25 against the 65-35 and 35-65 types, and 2.5 against the 50-50
type. If subjects act to maximize their expected payments, then these expected payments
are valid proxies for subjects’ subjectively perceived expected payments. Also note that the
past payments, expected payments, and others’ payments are all reported in the same units,
so we can directly compare coe!cients in my regressions to make speciﬁc statements about
the relative magnitude of each factor’s impact on satisfaction.
Second, the payment structure facilitates the interpretation of the results. The payment
range is 0 to 5, thus yielding six possible payment outcomes, while the satisfaction rating is on
a seven category scale. Because the scale and payment range are not the same, subjects will
be less inclined to associate a particular monetary payment with a “natural” satisfaction
report. For example, if the satisfaction scale was 0 to 5 like the payment range, and a
subject received payment 3, she might automatically associate a payment 3 with satisfaction
3. Under this design, the satisfaction report requires more of a subjective assessment and
any non-linearity in the responses can contain meaningful information.
Third, the optimal decision to maximize expected payments is a simple one. As described
above, the expected payment maximizing choice depends on the partner-type, is easy for the
subject to deduce, and is incentivized because outcomes correspond to take-home monetary
amounts. As will be seen below, the large majority of individual coin choices do correspond
to expected payment maximization, which supports our use of the expected payment to
capture a subject’s subjectively perceived expected payment.
Finally, the satisfaction data arising from the experiment are clearly post-choice. The
satisfaction question is asked after the outcome of the choice. Moreover, it is asked in
manner designed to get at the quality of the outcome.
4 Econometric Methodology
4.1 Econometric Issues and Estimation Strategy
There exist various econometric methods for estimating a satisfaction function, yet there
is no single best method given the constraints of our data. Three particular issues stand
out. First, the dependent variable is discretely ordinal and not cardinal. Technically
11speaking, concavity in gains and convexity in losses are psychological conditions that can
exist whether or not they are cardinally measurable (Mandler 1999), yet we in this paper
are concerned with empirically identifying such properties. As such, we must be interested
in satisfaction as a cardinal property and thus must confront the limitation of having only
ordinal data. Second, conducting formal statistical tests of the hypotheses requires that
we impose a parametric structure on the satisfaction function, but imposing such structure
limits the possible shapes that the estimated function can take. Third, previous studies
ﬁnd that subjective reports of satisfaction or happiness exhibit signiﬁcant individual-level
ﬁxed eects due to personality or genetic traits (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004), yet
adequately controlling for ﬁxed eects is not possible in all regression frameworks. It is
possible for OLS but is problematic in discrete dependent variable contexts.
Economists typically use ordered probit or ordered logit regressions when working with
ordinal data. Because these regressions condition on the ordinal properties of the dependent
variable by assuming an underlying latent variable function, neither their estimates nor
the estimates of the underlying latent variable function have a cardinal interpretation (see
Vendrik and Woltjer 2007 and references therein). Thus, these regressions do not allow us to
make statements about the shape of the satisfaction function. With this in mind, previous
researchers in the economics of happiness have assumed that the ordinal response data have
cardinal meaning, e.g., Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) and Layard, Mayraz, and Nickell (2008).
We also make this assumption9.
An argument can be made for assuming cardinality with our data. First, it makes inter-
pretation of the results straightforward and can allow for formal statistical tests. Second,
having many response categories–more than there are possible payment outcomes–suggests
that any non-linearity in responses may reﬂect non-linearity in satisfaction. One might think
that a player who receives the lowest or highest possible payment would give the lowest or
highest possible satisfaction response, respectively. However, when there are more response
9It could be argued that Bayesian techniques can actually bridge the gap between assuming a cardinal
interpretation of the dependent variable and treating it as strictly ordinal. To explore this possibility, we
estimated ordered probit regressions using Bayesian methods. We discuss this methodology and results in
a technical appendix that is available from the authors upon request. We note brieﬂy here that we did ﬁnd
an S-shape using expected payment and comparison payment but not past payment. However, as explained
in that appendix, giving the results a cardinal interpretation is problematic.
12choices than payment outcomes, any non-linearity in the reported satisfaction can be more
easily manifested. Third, there is evidence that ratings scales like those in our data pro-
vide what psychophysicists call linear judgement functions. The idea is that an underlying
stimulus (e.g., payment) produces a psychological sensation (e.g., level of satisfaction) that
the subject must then judge for placement on the reporting scale (e.g., satisfaction report).
Some research indicates that the judgement process is linear for category scales (see Marks
and Algom 1998, 137). For our study, this implies that any non-linearity in responses results
from non-linearity in underlying psychological satisfaction and not the actual reporting of
satisfaction.
With our cardinality assumption in place, our strategy to confront the other econometric
issues mentioned above is to estimate satisfaction functions under a variety of methods and
assumptions and look for an emergent pattern. The basic equation of interest is
klw = i (glw)+%lw>
glw = |lw  ulw>
where, for subject l in round w, klw is the reported happiness, glw is the dierence between the
monetary payment |lw and the reference point ulw,a n d%lw is a random disturbance term. We
ﬁrst estimate non-parametric spline regressions at both the individual level and with pooled
data. These regressions allow for maximum ﬂexibility in functional shape while assuming a
particular reference point. We then estimate two types of parametric regressions: non-linear
power form regressions and ﬁxed eects OLS regressions. The power form regressions allow
for formal statistical tests and for the explicit estimation of a reference point function, but
they do not account for individual ﬁxed eects. The ﬁxed eects OLS regressions control
for ﬁxed eects and allow for higher order polynomials, but they do not allow for explicit
reference point estimation.
4.2 Spline Regressions
One option available to allow for a ﬂexible functional form is a cubic spline regression. In
general, spline functions are functional forms ﬁt onto a sub-segment of the data. These sub-
segments are speciﬁed by n knot points 1>===>n, which can be chosen ap r i o r i ,o rd e t e r m i n e d
13analytically through the data.10 Once knots are selected, the variable entering the spline
operator (in our case, glw) is transformed into a 1 × n  1 vector Glw =[ gl1>g l2>===>gln31] so
as to estimate the parameters  and  of following linear regression

















The subscript “+” denotes the inclusion of the term inside the parentheses if glw A m31, zero
otherwise. For example, let m =2and n =3 .I f glw =2 0 , 1 =1 9 , 2 =2 5 , 3 =3 6 ,t h e n
gl2 =
(20319)3
(36319)2. Since the observation glw =2 0is less than the other knots, the other parts of
equation (2) contain zeros in the numerator and drop out of the equation. We can estimate
equation (1) by OLS and use linear predictions to calculate the expected satisfaction. These
predictions are then plotted against the scaled payment variable to trace out an S-shape.
We also calculate and plot conﬁdence intervals for the spline functions using the standard
error of prediction based on the estimation of equation (1). Simply, the interval is the
prediction plus or minus the 1.96 times the estimated standard error.
As with prospect theory, the inﬂection point in the satisfaction function corresponds
to the reference point. Choice of the reference point is a non-trivial matter because it
is a central variable for theory. This data set provides us with three possible reference
points taken exogenously. The ﬁrst is the payment received by player l in the previous
round w  1 (PREVPAY). The second is the expected payment that player l should receive
based on the partner type (EPMAX). The third reference point is the average payment
received by all other subjects (excluding player l) in the round who have the same partner
t y p e( T Y P E A V G ) .T h ei n d e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l ei nt h es p l i n ee q u a t i o ni st h ed i erence of the
payment received and one of the reference points mentioned. We note that there exists the
10It is common to use percentiles or evenly spaced interval values as knot points. However, since knot
point choice is not crucial to our analysis, we remain agnostic about our knot points.
14possibility that the true reference point is some weighted average of PREVPAY, EPMAX
and TYPEAVG,
ulw = j0 + j1SUHYSD\lw + j2HSPD[lw + j3RZQDYJlw>
where the j coe!cients are unknown ap r i o r iand can be estimated. For the spline analysis,
we do not attempt to employ any unobserved weighted average as the reference point, but
we do employ the weighted average for our power regressions.
4.3 Power Form Non-linear Regressions
The power form is a functional form widely used in the economics and psychology litera-
ture because multiple studies ﬁnd that it well represents subjects’ choices (Luce 2000: 80).




lw>g lw  0>
2 (glw)
 >g lw ? 0> (3)
where klw (glw)  0 if glw  0 and klw (glw) ? 0 if glw ? 0.
If the function is S-shaped, then we must have
1 A 0> (4)
2 ? 0> (5)
0 ? ? 1= (6)
Loss aversion requires
|1| ? |2|= (7)
One beneﬁt of the power form regression is that it allows us to not only choose an
exogenous reference point but to also model an unobserved reference point that is a function
of PREVPAY, EPMAX and TYPEAVG. Let |lw be the current monetary payment deﬁne b ulw
be the estimate of the unobserved reference point
b ulw = j0 + j1|lw31 + j2hlw + j3flw= (8)
15Dropping the glw notation temporarily so that the inequality constraints can be easily
represented, we can thus write the satisfaction function for l in time w as
klw =
½
1 (|lw  b ulw)
  4>| lw  b ulw (SUHYSD\lw>HSPD[ lw>W\SHDYJ lw)>
2 (b ulw  |lw)
  4>| lw ? b ulw (SUHYSD\lw>HSPD[ lw>W\SHDYJ lw)= (9)
The minus 4 normalizes the boundary between satisfaction and satisfaction to 0. For the
S-shape and loss aversion, we need conditions (4)-(7) to hold as before.
We assume that any error comes in the satisfaction directly and not through the reference
point calculation. These assumptions yield the following non-linear least squares regression:
b ulw = j0 + j1SUHYSD\lw + j2HSPD[lw + j3W\SHDYJlw (10)
klw =
½
1 (|lw  b ulw)
  4+%lw>| lw  b ulw>
2 (b ulw  |lw)
  4+%lw>| lw ? b ulw= (11)
Notice that the power function shape (parameters 1, 2,a n d) are estimated simul-
taneously with the reference point function parameters (j0, j1, j2,a n dj3). This fact
is important because it allows the maximization procedure to identify the reference point
that best matches the inﬂection point of the S-shape should it have an S-shape. The es-
timation procedure imposes some meaningful structure on the reference point by tying it
to the three factors thought to aect judgements instead of just allowing the procedure
to identify any reference point for each observation. Also note that, more in line with
our understanding of reference points, this setup assumes that the reference point factors
(SUHYSD\lw>HSPD[ lw>W\SHDYJ lw) impact satisfaction via their eects on the refer-
ence point. The factors will thus shift the entire function horizontally instead of vertically.
This regression also allows for direct testing of loss aversion because we can formally test
conditions (4)-(7).




1 (|lw  b ulw)
1  4+%lw>| lw  b ulw>
2 (b ulw  |lw)
2  4+%lw>| lw ? b ulw=
The S-shape now arises when the following conditions hold: 1 A 0, 2 ? 0, 0 ? 1 ? 1
and 0 ? 2 ? 1. Testing for loss aversion is not as simple as checking |1| ? |2| because
dierences in 1 and 2 are relevant. Instead, loss aversion requires checking the predicted
16happiness at each estimated point. That is, if b klw (g) is the predicted happiness at point g,
then loss aversion arises when
¯ ¯ ¯b klw (g)
¯ ¯ ¯ ?
¯ ¯ ¯b klw (g)
¯ ¯ ¯ for gA0.
4.4 Fixed-eects OLS Regressions
Given the setup of the data, the observations include individuals who report satisfaction for
multiple rounds. It is natural to suppose that there is some unobservable characteristic that
aects the reported satisfaction with the outcome and that is heterogenous across individuals.
For example, some individuals playing the game may have a higher level of baseline happiness.
Controlling for these individual eects (these are the ﬁxed eects because they are assumed
to not change over the course of the game play) can be accomplished through dierencing,
or individual dummy variable identiﬁcation, which strategy we use here. We also cluster
the standard errors at the level of the individual. We model our estimation as
klw = i(glw)+fl + %lw>
using the previously deﬁned glw.T h e t e r m fl is the unobserved individual level characteristic
controlled for by dummy variables. To allow for the emergence of an S-shaped satisfaction
function, we approximate the function i (glw) in the ﬁxed-eects OLS model with polynomial
expansions of orders one, three, and ﬁve:11
Order 1: i (glw)=1glw
Order 3: i (glw)=1glw + 2g2
lw + 3g3
lw





The polynomial expansions capture any higher order curvature in reported satisfaction. The
order one expansion is included in the analysis for comparison purposes with the order 3 and
order 5 expansions.
11We estimated polynomial expansions of orders two and four as well, to check the sensitivity of the results.
A polynomial of Order 2 constrains the functional form from exhibiting an S shape, and was left out. The
Order 4 coe!cient for each reference point was not statistically signiﬁcant.
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5.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the payment and reported satisfaction data. Each cell in the table dis-
plays the number of subjects who reported the satisfaction level of the vertical axis when
receiving the payment amount on the horizontal axis. The mean reported satisfaction, re-
ported below each payment-satisfaction combination in the table, increases as the payment
increases. The modal reported satisfaction for each payment amount (boxed) is also (weakly)
increasing in payment. A cursory glance at both the mean and modal reported satisfaction
suggests an S-shape because the reported satisfaction in either case increases at an acceler-
ating rate at lower payments and that rate decreases at higher payment levels.
Table 2 presents evidence on the validity of the EPMAX measure. Roughly 90% of all coin
choices are consistent with the assumption that subjects acted to maximize their expected
payos. The percentage of times that a subject’s ﬁve-coin decision in a round matches
expected payment maximization is much lower, probably a reﬂection of a misunderstanding of
independence. However, the large majority are consistent, thus suggesting that the expected
payment proxy is a valid proxy of a subject’s actual expected payment.
5.2 Non-parametric Regression Results
We ﬁrst use non-parametric spline techniques to estimate three satisfaction functions for
each individual, one for each of the three reference factors. Visual inspection then allows us
to classify each function as either S-shaped, linear, convex, concave, with multiple inﬂection
points, or other; formal statistical tests are not possible due to the ﬂexible estimation
structure. Table 3 summarizes what we observed. The S-shape is the modal shape when
using the previous payment as the reference points: 13 out of 36 individual functions show
the S-shape, 9 exhibit multiple inﬂections, 7 are linear, and so on. The S-shape is not modal
when using the expected payment (only 7 out of 36) or comparison payment (only 9 out
of 26) as the reference point; however, the S-shape does appear frequently. Moreover, we
note that this classiﬁcation is fairly strict. We have 25 observations per individual, and
with more observations per individual, we suspect that some of those functions classiﬁed as
18multiple inﬂection, which comprise the largest category, would likely become S-shaped as
the function’s smoothness would increase.
Figures 3(a)-(c) plot the satisfaction functions and 95% conﬁdence intervals estimated
via non-parametric splines when pooling the data. Each estimated function used a dierent
one of the three candidate reference points. When using expected payment or comparison
payment as the reference point, we ﬁnd clear evidence of the S-shape. It is not S-shaped
when using previous payment; it is fairly linear but slightly concave. If indeed the reference
point depends on all three factors, then the S-shape may best represent the data overall.
5.3 Power Form Results
Table 4 presents results from two non-linear least squares regressions that estimate coe!-
cients of a power form. Regression 1 assumes that the exponent is the same regardless of
whether or not the payment is larger than the reference point. Regression 2 allows for the
exponent term to be dierent, depending on whether or not the payment is larger than the
reference point. Figure 4 displays the two regressions graphically.
To test the ﬁrst hypothesis (S-shape), we look at exponent coe!cient .A n e x p o n e n t
greater between zero and one produces an S-shape, though values closer to one approximate
linearity. Regression 1 yields  =0 =61, which is statistically signiﬁcant, conﬁrming an
S-shape. Regression 2 allows the exponent to dier for relative gains and losses. When
the payment is greater than the reference point, the estimate 1 is 0.73 and is statistically
signiﬁcant. When the payment is less than the reference point, the estimate of 2 is 0.48 and
is also statistically signiﬁcant. All estimates conﬁrm the S-shape. We reject the hypothesis
that 1 = 2 at the 5% level; the concavity in relative gains is not as sharp as that for
relative losses. Figure 4 plots the two regressions and clearly illustrates the S-shape.
For the second hypothesis (loss aversion), we test the equivalence of 1 and 2 in regres-
sion 1. If 1 = 2 in regression 1, then a one unit loss relative to the reference point has the
same magnitude change in utility as a one unit gain. Loss aversion requires that a change in
satisfaction be larger for losses than for gains. We ﬁnd, under the assumption of a common
value of ,t h a t1 diers statistically from 2, yet, the dierence is not in the direction as
expected. Loss aversion would imply |1| ? |2| in regression 1, but we ﬁnd |1| A |2|,
19though the level of statistical signiﬁcance is not high. When estimating separate ’s in
regression 2, we do ﬁnd |1| ? |2|, however we must now consider the dierent exponent
estimates 1 and 2 when checking for loss aversion. A visual inspection of the regression
2 in Figure 4 shows that there is not loss aversion for small gains or losses but that there is
loss aversion for larger gains and losses. Thus, evidence of loss aversion is mixed.
For the third hypothesis (reference point eects), we consider the coe!cients j0, j1, j2,
and j3 estimated for the reference point function. In both regressions, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
evidence that the three coe!cients on the reference point factors (j1, j2,a n dj3)a r ej o i n t l y
signiﬁcant. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the expected payment and comparison payment
have statistically signiﬁcant positive eects on the reference point in the ﬁrst regression.
Both work the same direction in the second regression, though the eect of an increase in
comparison payment is now not statistically signiﬁcant. Contrary to the hypothesis, the
previous payment has a negative eect on the reference point. Larger values in the previous
round reduce the perceived reference point. As explained by McBride (2008), this could
be due to a short-term positive glow eect from receiving a high payment that lasts into
the next round. In words, a subject who receives a high payment in round w m i g h th a v ea
temporary happy feeling that lasts into the next round.
To test the fourth hypothesis (weighted reference point factors), we test if j0 =0and
j1 + j2 + j3 =1 . The F-statistics in the last row of Table 4 strongly reject this hypothesis
even at the 1% level in each regression. The reference point is not a simple weighted average
of the three reference point factors. Instead, there is a large ﬁxed component. Moreover, the
expected payment and comparison payments have a much larger impact than the previous
payment which, as mentioned above, works in an opposite direction.
5.4 Fixed-eect OLS Regression Results
Table 5 displays the results of various ﬁxed-eects OLS regressions: three order 1 polynomial
regressions, three order 3 polynomial regressions, and three order 5 polynomial regressions.
For each order, we estimated a regression using each dierent reference point factor as the
reference point. Various test statistics are reported at the bottom of the table. Consider the
order 3 regressions. For the expected payment and comparison payment reference points,
20the coe!cients for each polynomial order are signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the need for higher
order polynomials. In contrast, the order 3 coe!cient for the previous payment reference
point is not signiﬁcant at the 10% level. However, when tested jointly with the second order
coe!cient, the null hypothesis is rejected and the order 3 speciﬁcation should be included.
Under previous payment and comparison payment reference points, the order 5 regressions
do not show signiﬁcant order 4 coe!cients, even when order 5 eects appear to be marginally
signiﬁcant, but there are such eects under previous payment. For the order 5 regressions,
we conduct two joint tests: the ﬁrst to test the restrictions on the order 4 and 5 coe!cients,
while the second is the joint signiﬁcance test on all regression coe!cients. We ﬁnd that under
previous payment and comparison payment reference points, the coe!cients for orders 4 and
5 are jointly insigniﬁcant, indicating that an order 3 polynomial model would be su!cient
to capture the curvature, though the order 5 polynomial speciﬁcation is necessary when
previous payment is used as the reference point.
Figure 6 plots the estimated satisfaction function for each of these regressions. We see
the clear S-shape under expected payment and comparison payment. The higher order
curvature estimated in the polynomial regressions produce S-shapes as predicted in these
cases. The S-shape does not appear under previous payment; instead it is a mirrored
S-shape with concavity in losses and convexity in gains.
To assess the robustness of this result, we partitioned the data into two subsamples.
The ﬁrst subsample included all subject-rounds in which the subject choose all ﬁve coins
consistent with expected payo maximization, while the second subsample included subject-
rounds in which the subject did not act consistently with expected payo maximization.12
We ﬁnd a much stronger S-shape in the ﬁrst sample when using expected payment and
comparison payment as the reference point (results not shown). We cannot be sure why this
speciﬁc pattern is found, yet there is an interpretation consistent with our overall emerging
picture. Subjects who act consistently with expected payo maximzation have more accurate
expectations about their payos, and the expected payo maximization and comparison
12Any coin choice by a subject matched with a 50-50 partner-type is consistent with expected payo
maximization, and there is no way to separately identify the subjects matched with 50-50 partners who
were actively trying to maximize expected payos from those who were not. For this reason, we took a
conservative approach and included them in the second subsample.
21payment reference point factors would more accurately reﬂect those subjects’ self-perceived
reference point. If true, then the second subsample underestimates the S-shape that exists
in those subjects’ actual satisfaction functions. This interpretation lends added credence to
the overall conclusion that subjects have S-shaped satisfaction functions.
5.5 Discussion
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we ﬁnd an emerging pattern from our empirical analysis that
satisfaction is well-represented by an S-shaped satisfaction function. This is true especially
when using expected payment or comparison payment as reference point; it is less true
when using previous payment as the reference point. When estimating a reference point
function in our power regressions, we ﬁnd that expected payment and comparison payment
have the anticipated eects on reference points but previous payment does not. Thus, two
out of the three parts of Hypothesis 3 are veriﬁed. Hypothesis 4 is rejected: the reference
point is increasing faster in expected payment and comparison payment than it is decreasing
in previous payment. How to assess Hypothesis 4 is less clear because the evidence of loss
aversion is mixed. Overall, however, the S-shape ﬁts the data well in most of our regressions.
Why do we ﬁnd the S-shape? One possible two-part explanation goes as follows. First,
decision utility and experienced utility are fundamentally related via underlying psychophysi-
cal processes as suggested in Section 2. Second, the dierences that do exist between decision
utility and experienced utility increase in prominence as the time between the decision and
the reporting of the experience. Because the time between the making of a decision and the
reporting of satisfaction in the experimental data is fairly short (usually a matter of seconds),
any dierence between decision utility and experienced utility would be minimized. This
conjecture could be tested by running additional experiments that vary the length of time
between the decision and satisfaction report.
This logic situates our paper somewhere between empirical estimations of the decision
utility functions on one end of the spectrum and Vendrik and Woltjer’s (2007) and Layard,
Mayraz, and Nickell’s (2008) results on the other end. Decision utility is derived from
observed decisions. Life satisfaction, on the other hand, is a reﬂective assessment of one’s
overall life situation and reﬂects the outcomes of a large number of life decisions (e.g., whether
22or not to go to college, accept a job oer, marry, etc.). That the cited studies found a
concave (not S-shaped) life satisfaction function would thus reﬂect a dierence between
decision utility and experienced utility that arises over time in the context of the reﬂective
life satisfaction question. The satisfaction with an experiment payment in our data is much
closer to the actual decision made. Any indirect linkage, psychophysical or not, between
decision and experienced utility would be stronger in our setting.
Why is the evidence for loss aversion mixed? One possibility is that the distribution of
realized payments is heavily skewed, with the mean payment 3.24 much closer to the highest
possible payment 5 than the lowest possible payment 0. Suppose that 3.24 best represents
the reference point, that a subject who receives a payment of 5 achieves her highest possible
satisfaction and would report satisfaction 7, and that a subject who receives a payment of 0
achieves her lowest satisfaction and would report satisfaction 1. Then a relative gain of 1=76
(equals 5  3=24) yields an increase in satisfaction of 3 (from 7  4), while a relative loss of
3=24 (equals 03=24) yields a change in satisfaction of 3 (from 14). Having reference
points closer to the highest possible category implies a smaller range of relative gains which,
according to the interpretation of the reporting scale, are spread over a larger reporting
range. This leads to a steeper function in gains than losses not due to psychophysical
processes but due to distribution of payments.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper uses various econometric techniques to estimate experimental subjects’ reported
satisfaction functions. We ﬁnd strong evidence that an S-shape best represents subjects’ sat-
isfaction responses, and we suggest that this shape could arise from psychophysical processes
similar to those that generate S-shaped decision utility. We do not ﬁnd compelling evidence
of loss aversion, but we do ﬁnd a role for various factors in the formation of subjects’ refer-
ence points. Expected payments and comparison payments work to raise reference points
as predicted but previous payments do not.
Future work has many avenues to pursue in building on this work. One direction is
to explicitly account for time in a subjects’ satisfaction function: How does the shape of
23experienced utility change over time? Do people become less sensitive to comparisons or
expectations? Another direction is to further examine how reference points are determined:
Which other reference point factors should be considered in a theory of reference point deter-
mination? A competing theory called range-frequency explicitly incorporates the properties
of the distribution of stimuli into its account of how subjects rate those stimuli. Future
work should compare the range-frequency theory with the theory presented here to determine
which better ﬁts the data. Work along these lines will yield a more complete understanding
of how people subjectively experience the outcomes of their many economic decisions.
AP r o o f s
Proof 1: First apply the chain rule twice to obtain the second derivative C2x
C|2 for |  u,a n d
then solve for when it is less than 0 to obtain the condition for concavity for when |  u:
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? 0,a n dCv
C| A 0, this condition states that C2h x
Cv2 must be less than a
positive amount.
Applying the chain rule twice again and solving for when the second derivative is greater
than 0 to ﬁnd convexity for |?u ,w eg e t :
Cx
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A 0,a n dCv
C| A 0, this condition states that C2h x
Cv2 must be greater than
an e g a t i v ea m o u n t . ¤
Proof 2: Need to show when e x(} (u + {|u)) ? |e x(} (u  {|u))|.
Case I: e x(·) is weakly concave. Deﬁne {} ({>u)  } (u  {|u)  } (u + {|u).W i t h
} (0|u)=0 , we see that } (u  {|u) A 0 and } (u + {|u) A 0. With loss aversion in } (·),
24{} ({>u) A 0 for all {A0.N o t i c e t h a t Ch x
C} A 0 and C2h x
C}2  0 implies e x(}0)  e x(0) 
e x(0)  e x(}0) for all }0 A 0.W i t h e x(0|u)=0 , this in turn implies e x(}0)  |e x(}0)|
for all }A0 and |e x(}0)| ? |e x(}0  }00)| with }00 A 0.I f w e l e t }0 = } (u + {|u) and
}00 = {} ({>u),t h e ni tf o l l o w sf o ra l l{A0 that
e x(} (u + {|u)) ? |e x(y  y
0)|
= |e x((} (u + {|u))  {} ({>u))|
= |e x(} (u  {|u))|=
Case II: e x(·) is strictly convex. Contrary to Case I, convexity implies e x(}0) A |e x(}0)|.
However, with |e x(}0)| increasing in }0,i tm u s tb et r u et h a tt h e r ee x i s t ss o m e}00 A 0
such that e x(}0) ? |e x(}0  }000)| for all }000 A} 00.T h e m o r e c o n v e x i s e x(·), the higher
is }00. Hence if e x(·)’s convexity is su!ciently small, then }00 is su!ciently small so that
}00 ? {} ({>u).I f t r u e , t h e n
e x(} (u + {|u)) ? |e x(y  y
0)|
= |e x((} (u + {|u))  {} ({>u))|
= |e x(} (u  {|u))|= ¤
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Figure 2:  The Matching Pennies GamePayment
012345 T o t a l
7 0 0 1 10 47 120 178
6 0004 117 1 122
Reported 5 0 0 1 38 51 0 90
Satisfaction 4 1 3 9 96 39 7 155
30 4 3 3 5 8 4 0 9 9
20 5 65 28 1 0 99
1 11 50 44 15 0 1 121
Total 12 62 153 249 259 129 864
Mean 1.25 1.35 2.10 3.67 5.62 6.78 4.24
Increase in Mean 0.10 0.74 1.57 1.95 1.16
Notes:  900 observations used for Treatment C with 36 total subjects.
Table 1:  Observations by Payment and Reported Satisfaction






rounds in which all 




Percent of Subjects 




Pooled 93% 73% 25%
Expected Payment 2.5 100% 100% 100%
Expected Payment 3.25 86% 58% 25%
Expected Payment 4.0 94% 78% 53%
Notes:  900 observations usedf or Treatment C with 36 total subjects.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































eFigure 3(a): Spline Satisfaction Function with Expected Payment as 
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Figure 3(b): Spline Satisfaction Function with Previous Payment as 
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Figure 3(c): Spline Satisfaction Function with Comparison Payment 
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g 0 (Constant) 2.66** 2.81**
(0.11) (0.11)
g 1 (Previous Payment) -0.04** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01)
g 2 (Expected Payment) 0.07* 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)




Į (Exponent) 0.61** --
(0.04)
Į 1 (Gain Exponent) -- 0.73**
(0.07)
Į 2 (Loss Exponent) -- 0.48**
(0.07)
ȕ 1 (Gain Coefficient) 1.87** 1.74**
(0.05) (0.07)





W-test:  ȕ 1 = -ȕ 2 2.87* 0.52
Test:  Į 1 = Į 2 -- 5.20*
Joint test:  ȕ 1 = -ȕ 2, Į 1 = Į 2 -- 7.81*
Test:  g 0 = 0 514.85** 665.31**
Test:  g 1 = g2 = g3 = 0 25.42** 9.56*
Test:  g0 = 0, g 1 + g2 + g3 = 1 525.35** 665.36**
Table 4:  Power Form Non-linear Regression Results
Notes:  The dependent variable in each regression was reported satisfaction.  Each 
regression used the last 24 rounds of the experiment session.  Standard errors are 
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tFigure 6:  Fixed-effects OLS Polynomial Satisfaction Functions
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